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Abstract
Comparative law is a field of study whose object is the comparison of legal systems 
with a view to obtaining knowledge that may be used for a variety of theoretical and 
practical purposes. It embraces: the comparing of legal systems with the purpose of 
ascertaining their differences and similarities; the systematic analysis and evaluation 
of the solutions which two or more systems offer for a particular legal problem; and 
the treatment of methodological problems that arise in connection with the 
comparative process and the study of foreign law. One type of interest pertaining to 
knowledge and explanation in comparative law is associated with the traditional 
comparison de lege lata and/or de lege ferenda. Pursuant to this comparison are 
searches for models for the formulation of new legislative policies at a domestic, 
regional or international level. Comparative law can also be a valuable tool when 
courts and other authorities interpret and apply legal rules or are faced with the task 
of filling gaps in legislation or case law. However, when carrying out their tasks, 
comparative law researchers are often faced with vexing methodological problems. 
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Some of these problems pertain to difficulties in establishing the so-called tertium 
comparationis – the common denominator between the legal rules or institutions 
under consideration that makes comparison possible. This paper examines some key 
aspects of comparative law methodology, with particular attention being paid to the 
normative-dogmatic and functional approaches to the comparability issue. It is 
submitted that, depending on the demands and goals of the particular research 
project, combining elements of these two approaches may provide a useful way of 
addressing some of the methodological challenges that arise in the context of 
comparative law research.
Introduction
Modern comparative law has progressed through different stages of evolution. 
Influenced by developments in the social and biological sciences and a renewed 
interest in history and linguistics during the nineteenth century, comparatists tended 
to focus, at that time, upon the historical development of legal systems with a view to 
tracing broad patterns of legal progress common to all societies. The notion of 
organic evolution of law as a social phenomenon led scholars to search for basic 
structures, or a ‘morphology’, of law and other social institutions. They sought and 
constructed evolutionary patterns with a view to uncovering the essence of the idea of 
law. As Franz Bernhöft remarked, “comparative law seeks to teach how peoples of 
common heritage elaborate the inherited legal notions for themselves; how one 
people receives institutions from another and modifies them according to their own 
views; and finally how legal systems of different nations evolve even without any 
factual interconnection according to the common laws of evolution. It searches, in 
short, within the systems of law, for the idea of law”.  In the late the nineteenth 
century, the French scholars Édouard Lambert and Raymond Saleilles, motivated by a 
universalist vision of law, advocated the search for what they referred to as the 
‘common stock of legal solutions’ from amongst all the advanced legal systems of the 
world. This idea was introduced at the First International Congress of Comparative 
Law, held in Paris in 1900, which also adopted the view of comparative law as an 
independent and substantive science concerned with unravelling the patterns of legal 
development common to all advanced nations.
However, in the first half of the twentieth century the view prevailed among 
scholars that comparative law is no more than a method to be employed for diverse 
purposes in the study of law. According to this view, comparative law is simply a 
means to an end and therefore the purpose for which the comparative method is 
utilized should provide the basis for any definition of comparative law as a subject. 
This approach entailed a shift in emphasis from comparative law as an independent 
discipline to the uses of the comparative method in the study of law. By focusing on 
the uses of the comparative method, comparatists divided their activities into 
categories, such as ‘descriptive comparative law’ or ‘comparative nomoscopy’, 
F. Bernhöft, “Ueber Zweck und Mittel der vergleichenden Rechtswissenschaft”, (1878) 1 
Zeitschrift für vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft, 1 at 36-37. And see E. Rothacker, “Die 
vergleichende Methode in den Geisteswissenschaften”, (1957) 60 Zeitschrift für vergleichende 
Rechtswissenschaft, 13 at 17. According to Giorgio del Vecchio, “many legal principles and 
institutions constitute a common property of mankind. One can identify uniform tendencies in 
the evolution of the legal systems of different peoples, so that it may be said that, in general, all 
systems go through similar phases of development.” “L’ unité de l’ esprit humain comme base 
de la comparaison juridique”, (1950) 2 (4) Revue internationale de droit comparé, 686 at 688.
See G. Dannemann, “Comparative Law: Study of Similarities or Differences?”, in M. 
Reimann & R. Zimmerman (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2019), 390, 392.
The co-called ‘method theory’ has been advocated by a number of eminent comparatists, 
including Frederick Pollock, René David and Harold Cooke Gutteridge. See M. Siems, 
Comparative Law, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2018), 6-7. Consider also 
J. Hall, Comparative Law and Social Theory (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 
1963), 7-10.
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signifying the mere description of foreign laws; ‘comparative nomothetics’, 
concerned with the comparative evaluation of legal systems; ‘comparative 
nomogenetics’ or ‘comparative history of law’, focusing on the evolution of legal 
norms and institutions of diverse systems; ‘legislative comparative law’, referring to 
the process whereby foreign laws are invoked for the purpose of drafting new 
national laws; and ‘applied comparative law’ or ‘comparative jurisprudence’, with 
respect to which the aim of the comparative study may be, for instance, to assist a 
legal philosopher in constructing abstract theories of law, or a legal historian in 
tracing the origins and development of legal concepts and institutions.  Such 
divisions do not militate against the basic unity of the comparative method. As Harold 
Gutteridge pointed out, comparative law is not fragmentary in nature: it does not 
consist of a patchwork of independent inquiries related to each other only by virtue of 
the fact that they all involve the study of different legal systems. The basic feature of 
comparative law, understood as a method, is that it can be applied to all types and 
fields of legal inquiry. It is equally employed by the legal philosopher, the legal 
historian, the judge, the legal practitioner and the law teacher, and covers the domain 
of both public and private law.
One might say that those who construe comparative law as a method and those 
who view it as a science look at it from different angles. When speaking of ‘laws’ and 
‘rules’, the former appear to have in mind normative ‘laws’ and ‘rules’ – the things 
that legal professionals commonly work with. The latter, on the other hand, tend to 
perceive law primarily as a social and cultural phenomenon, and the relationship 
See in general H. C. Gutteridge, Comparative Law: An Introduction to the Comparative 
Method of Legal Study and Research (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1946, repr. 
2015), 4. 
H. C. Gutteridge, ibid at 10. And see G. Langrod, “Quelques réflexions méthodologiques sur 
la comparaison en science juridique”, (1957) (9) Revue internationale de droit comparé, 363-69. 
between law and society as being governed by ‘laws’ or ‘rules’, which transcend any 
one particular legal system.  At its simplest level, that of the description of differences 
and similarities between legal systems, the comparative method allows us to acquire a 
better understanding of the characteristic features of particular institutions or rules. 
But as the comparative method becomes more sophisticated, for example where the 
socioeconomic and political structures, historical background and cultural patterns 
that underpin legal institutions and rules are taken into account, the comparative 
method begins to produce explanations based on interrelated variables – explanations 
which become progressively more scientific in nature.  One might argue that a sharp 
dichotomy between science and method can be epistemologically dangerous, since 
there is no science without method. And what connects the two is the model whose 
aim is to relate the experience of the real world to an abstract scheme of elements and 
relations.  In this respect, one might say that comparative law is part of legal 
According to J. H. Merryman, a distinction may be made between ‘professional’ and 
‘academic’ comparative law scholarship. By professional comparative law scholarship, he 
means “the sort of work that is principally of interest and value to lawyers, judges and 
legislators professionally engaged in dealing with concrete legal questions. Academic 
[comparative law] can be divided into humanistic and scientific. Humanistic scholarship is in 
the tradition of philosophical, historical and literary description, narrative, interpretation, 
analysis and criticism. … scientific [refers to] scholarship that seeks to educe generalizations 
that can be used as the basis for explanations of and predictions about social-legal behavior. 
These are categories of convenience and are not mutually exclusive.” (1998) 21 Hastings 
International and Comparative Law Review 771, 772.
Among the leading scholars who advocated the intrinsic value of comparative law as a 
science and as an academic discipline is Ernst Rabel. According to him, “comparative law can 
release the kernel of legal phenomena from the shell of their formulae and superstructures and 
maintain the coherence of a common legal structure.” Cited in H. Coing, “Das deutsche 
Schuldrecht und die Rechtsvergleichung” (1956) Neue Juristische Wochenschrift, 569, 670. On 
the view that comparative law constitutes both a science and a method consider G. Winterton, 
“Comparative Law Teaching”, (1975) 23 American Journal of Comparative Law, 69.
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science, using the term ‘science’ to describe a discourse that functions at one and the 
same time within ‘facts’ and within the conceptual elements that make up ‘science’. 
And the goal of legal comparison as a science is to bring to light the differences 
existing between legal models, and to contribute to the knowledge of these models.  
Scientific comparative law is distinctive among the branches of legal science in that it 
depends primarily on the comparative method, whereas other branches may place 
greater emphasis on other methods of cognition available, such as empirical induction 
or a priori speculation. Thus, although comparative law is sometimes identified with 
legal sociology, it is really more confined. Naturally it does, however, support the 
other branches of legal science and is itself supported by them.
As the German jurist Anselm von Feuerbach has observed, “The richest source of all 
discoveries in every empirical science is comparison and combination. Only by manifold 
contrasts the contrary becomes completely clear; only by the observation of similarities and 
differences and the reasons for both may the peculiarity and inner nature be recognized in an 
exhaustive manner. Just as the comparison of various tongues produces the philosophy of 
language, or linguistic science proper, so does a comparison of laws and legal customs of the 
most varied nations, both those most nearly related to us and those farthest removed, create 
universal legal science, i.e., legal science without qualification, which alone can infuse real and 
vigorous life into the soecific legal science of any particular country.” Blick auf die deutsche 
Rechtswissenschaft, Vorrede zu Unterholzner, Juristische Abhandlungen (München 1810), in 
Anselms von Feuerbach kleine Schriften vermischten Inhalts (Osnabrück 1833), 163. Cited in 
W. Hug, “The History of Comparative Law”, (1932) 45 (6) Harvard Law Review 1027 at 1054. 
Consider also H. Barreau, L’ épistémologie, 3rd ed., (Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 
1995), 51.
See on this R. Sacco, La comparaison juridique au service de la connaissance du droit (Paris, 
Economica, 1991), 8; “Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law”, (1991) 39 
(1) American Journal of Comparative Law, 24-25, 389; G. Samuel, “Comparative Law and 
Jurisprudence”, (1998) 47 International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 817.
The Comparative Method 
The comparison is a mental process wherein two or more different objects are 
examined to determine their possible relationships. As an element of the cognition 
process, comparison cannot be considered separately from other logical means of 
cognition, such as analysis, synthesis, induction and deduction. Scientific comparison 
involves three interconnected aspects: a logical method of cognition; a process or 
cognitive activity; and a cognitive result, i.e. knowledge of a certain kind. It also 
embraces judgment and evaluative selection, as it is usually concerned with one or 
some aspects of the objects compared, while abstracting provisionally and 
conditionally other aspects. Comparison is used in all fields of scientific inquiry, 
although in each field the comparative method employed has its own distinct features 
that fulfil the relevant cognitive functions. A distinction may be drawn between the 
function of comparison as an element of cognition in general, and the comparative 
method as a relatively autonomous, systematically organized means of research 
designed to achieve specific aims of cognition.
Comparison is the essence of comparative law. In this context the comparative 
method is employed with a view to: (a) identifying the similarities and differences 
between two or more legal systems, or rules or institutions thereof; (b) elucidating the 
Contemporary comparatists acknowledge the important relationship between law, history and 
culture, and proceed from the assumption that every legal system is the product of several 
intertwining and interacting historical and socio-cultural factors. Thus, Alan Watson defines 
comparative law as “the study of the relationship between legal systems or between rules of 
more than one system … in the context of a historical relationship. [The study of] the nature of 
law and the nature of legal development.” Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law 
(Edinburgh, Scottish Academic Press, 1974; 2nd ed. Athens, Georgia, University of Georgia 
Press, 1993), 6-7. 
On the nature of the comparative process see N. Jansen, “Comparative Law and Comparative 
Knowledge”, in M. Reimann & R. Zimmermann (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative 
Law, 2nd ed., (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2019), 291.
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factors on the basis of which these similarities and differences may be explained; and 
(c) evaluating the legal models under comparison. The comparative method is used 
on both the descriptive-empirical and theoretical-evaluative levels. It may be applied 
in a variety of comparative inquiries concerning law, such as inquiries regarding the 
nature of the sources of law; the ideological foundations of legal institutions; the 
scope and operation of legal rules and principles; techniques of statutory 
interpretation; forms of legal procedure; and systems of legal education.  The 
selection of the particular legal systems or aspects thereof to compare naturally 
depends on the aims of the comparative study and the interests of the comparatist.
A legal comparison may be bilateral (between two legal systems) or 
multilateral (between more than two systems). It may focus on aspects of substantive 
law, or on formal characteristics of the legal systems under consideration, e.g. the 
techniques used in the interpretation of statutory enactments or judicial decisions. The 
subject of comparison may be legal systems or elements thereof that existed in the 
According to E. Örücü, in all fields of legal study the comparative method is “an empirical, 
descriptive research design using ‘comparison’ as a technique of cognisance”. See 
“Methodological Aspects of Comparative Law”, 2006 (8) 1 European Journal of Law Reform 
29.
As P. de Cruz remarks, “It has been argued by many eminent scholars that systems selected 
for comparison must be those which are at a similar stage of development, and these [scholars] 
include Gutteridge, Pollock, and Schmitthoff. Nevertheless, it is usually necessary to select 
systems or institutions which are at a similar stage of legal development, which will then ensure 
a baseline of similarity. However, it is not necessary that this is followed in every case, because 
the choice of legal systems must ultimately depend on the main aims and objectives of the 
particular comparative investigation.” A Modern Approach to Comparative Law (Devender, 
Kluwer, 1993), 36-37. And see W. J. Kamba, “Comparative Law: A Theoretical Framework”, 
(1974) 23 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 485, 506 ff. According to K. Zweigert 
and H. Kötz, it is difficult to speak in general terms about how a comparative law scholar should 
select legal systems for comparison, since much depends on the precise topic of his or her 
research. An Introduction to Comparative Law, 3rd ed., (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1998), 42.
past, (diachronic or historical legal comparison) or contemporary systems (synchronic 
comparison). Moreover, one may choose to compare legal systems of a particular 
region or transnational or international legal regimes. Comparison within a single 
state is referred to as internal comparison, in contradistinction to external comparison, 
i.e. comparison of laws belonging to different national or international legal orders. 
Internal comparison may pertain not only to federal but also to unitary states, and 
may be diachronic or synchronic. Mixed legal systems provide interesting materials 
for internal comparison within a unitary state. Such a comparison is useful for 
explaining the significance and possible interrelation of the various legal sub-systems 
within a unitary national legal system.
One can further distinguish between a comparison focusing on entire legal 
systems, or families of legal systems, and a comparison focusing on individual legal 
institutions, rules or practices. In the first case, we allude to macro-comparison, or 
comparative law in a broad sense; in the second case, we refer to micro-comparison, 
or comparative law in a narrow sense.  Macro-comparison is concerned with those 
features that determine the general character or style of different legal systems. It 
examines, for example, the historical origins and evolution of legal systems; the 
sources of law and their hierarchy; the ways in which legal material is distributed into 
branches of law; the procedures through which legal problems are addressed and 
resolved; the roles of those involved in law-making and the administration of justice; 
legislative techniques; styles of codification; approaches to statutory interpretation; 
modes of judicial decision-making; the contribution of legal scholars to the 
development of law; the division of labour among legal professionals; and forms of 
legal instruction. Micro-comparison, on the other hand, is concerned with particular 
See G. Dannemann, “Comparative Law: Study of Similarities or Differences?”, in M. 
Reimann & R. Zimmerman (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law, 2nd ed., (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2019), 390, 394.
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legal rules or institutions and the way in which these operate in different systems. 
Examples of questions falling within the province of micro-comparison include: 
What factors are relevant to determining the custody of children in divorce cases? 
Under what conditions is a manufacturer liable for damage caused to others by 
defective products? How is the issue of compensation addressed in the case of road 
traffic accidents? What are the rules governing an heir’s liability for the debts of the 
testator? What are the rights of an illegitimate child disinherited by his or her father 
or mother? What is the basis of liability of a person who allows his or her house to 
deteriorate to a state that a tile falls from the roof and injures a pedestrian? To what 
extent is it possible to have a contract foisted on a person because he or she failed to 
refuse an offer? As Zweigert and Kötz point out, micro-comparative and macro-
comparative inquiries are interrelated or interdependent, “for it is only by discovering 
how the relevant rules have been created and developed by the legislature and the 
courts and ascertaining the practical context in which they are applied that one can 
understand why a foreign legal system resolves a given problem the way it does and 
not otherwise.”
Familiarity with the legal rules and institutions one seeks to compare is an 
essential prerequisite for any meaningful comparison between legal systems. This 
means that the comparatist must obtain current and accurate information on the 
relevant aspects of the systems under consideration. However, in order to adequately 
learn the details of foreign law, one must overcome a number of practical and 
theoretical problems. In particular, one needs to keep in mind that the study of legal 
rules and institutions alone is hardly sufficient; it is also necessary that one takes into 
consideration factors relating to the context within which law operates and develops. 
K. Zweigert and H. Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law, 2nd ed., (Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1987), 5. And see G. Samuel, An Introduction to Comparative Law Theory and Method 
(Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2014), 50.
This context is not only the material context of sociology, history, economy and 
politics, but also the ideological context of the law as well as what may be called the 
‘juridical life’, i.e. all elements not pertaining to ideology in a strict sense but, rather, 
to tradition, to legal style or mentality. Describing foreign law entails more than 
merely reporting legal rules, and certainly more than simply quoting the wording of 
statutory enactments. In the first place, one has to determine which legal rules are in 
force and binding at the time of consideration. This is a formal problem: has a 
particular rule been abolished or not? But it is also a problem of content: is the rule 
under examination compatible with a rule of a higher level in the hierarchy of legal 
sources? If not, the rule should be considered invalid, and thus non-existent in the 
legal order being studied. However, concluding that the relevant rule is invalid is not 
simply a descriptive statement; it is the conclusion of an interpretation. This shows 
the extent to which description and interpretation of legal rules are interrelated. Every 
description of the law implies a (conscious or unconscious) interpretation of the law. 
Facts do not simply exist; they are always perceived, described and classified through 
the eyes of the legal system concerned. Because a factual situation may be 
constructed in different ways, solutions to problems that appear to be possible in one 
legal system are not available in another. Legal concepts, categories and techniques 
on the one hand offer opportunities for resolving problems but on the other render 
certain solutions impossible. As the above discussion suggests, any legal description 
of facts is determined by the conceptual framework and rules of a particular legal 
system, as worked out and systematized in legal doctrine over the years. Such a 
systematization is carried out by means of the interpretation of the various legal rules 
on the basis of a number of basic concepts and principles.  This indicates that there 
The systematization of the legal materials is always partly determined by the concepts and 
wording used by the chief sources of law, such as the legislature and the courts.
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is a close connection, not only between description and interpretation, but also 
between interpretation (of a specific rule) and systematization (of a set of rules). 
Legal doctrine, as concerned with the systematization and description of the law in a 
particular legal system, is, together with statute law, case law and customary law, an 
object of the comparative study. Moreover, legal doctrine is important for 
comparative law, because it is an area in which theories, such as, for instance, 
theories concerning legal sources, are made explicit, or proposed new theories are 
being discussed. 
Probably the greatest danger facing a comparatist is the tendency to assume, 
consciously or instinctively, that the legal concepts, norms and institutions he or she 
is familiar with in his or her own legal system also exist in the foreign system being 
studied.  A comparatist, for instance, may be tempted to take for granted that the 
courts of the country whose system he or she is examining, similarly to the courts of 
his or her own country, look for guidance in preparatory legislative materials when 
seeking to interpret a particular statutory enactment. Such assumptions can often 
agree with reality, but it is just as often that they are wrong. A basic methodological 
principle of comparative law is that foreign legal rules, institutions and concepts must 
be approached or appraised from the viewpoint of the legal order to which they 
belong. In other words, the comparatist must be able to distance himself or herself 
In the 1970s some Western lawyers asserted that China has no legal system because she has 
no attorneys in the American or European sense, no independent judiciary and, following the 
Cultural Revolution, no formal system of legal education. Yet, this is surely to judge a non-
Western system by Western standards. What is required when a non-Western system is being 
studied is not to search for Western institutions, rules or concepts, but to look for the functional 
equivalents of legal terms and concepts in the system under consideration. In other words, one 
should ask: by which institutions and which methods are the four basic tasks of the law, i.e., 
social control, conflict resolution, adaptation to social change and norm enforcement, are being 
performed?
from his or her own legal system and its way of thinking, placing himself or herself in 
the environment of the rules or institutions he or she is considering and using the 
legal concepts and methods of legal analysis and interpretation used by the lawyers 
and jurists of the foreign system or systems under consideration. As Zweigert and 
Kötz have remarked, “one must never allow one’s vision to be clouded by the 
concepts of one’s own national system.”  Needless to say, removing oneself from 
one’s own legal system when studying foreign law is not easy, for the legal education 
one has obtained in one’s own country influences to a large extent one’s way of 
thinking and approaching legal problems. False assumptions concerning foreign law 
naturally result in qualitatively poor and factually incorrect legal comparisons, but 
these potential difficulties should not discourage one from studying foreign law and 
making comparisons between different legal systems.
As already noted, the study of foreign law, as a prerequisite of comparative 
law, depends on one’s ability to obtain accurate and up-to-date knowledge about that 
law, and this in turn means that one must have access to reliable sources of 
information. It is important that a researcher relies on primary sources of law or 
authoritative texts, such as statutes, regulations, reports of judicial decisions and the 
like, although, depending on the goals and scope of the particular study, such 
materials may be combined with secondary sources, such as comparative law 
K. Zweigert & H. Kötz, H., An Introduction to Comparative Law, 2nd ed., (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1987), 31.
As Zweigert and Kötz observe, “Writers often stress the number of traps, snares, and 
delusions which can hinder the student of comparative law or lead him quite astray. It is 
impossible to enumerate them all or wholly to avoid them, even by the device of enlisting 
multinational terms for comparative endeavours ... [Even] the cleverest comparatists sometimes 
fall into error; when this happens the good custom among workers in the field is not to hound 
the forgivable miscreant with contumely from the profession, but kindly to put him right.” An 
Introduction to Comparative Law, 2nd ed., (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1987), 33.
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encyclopaedias, introductory textbooks, reference manuals, journal articles etc. A 
scholar researching a foreign legal system or aspect thereof may find it difficult to 
understand and make full use of the primary sources without having adequate 
background knowledge of the system being studied. Besides offering an overview of 
the legal issues under consideration in their broader legal context, introductory 
textbooks will normally include references to authoritative texts and other legal 
sources the researcher needs to consult.
It is important to note in this connection that a successful comparative study 
presupposes linguistic competence on the part of the comparatist and the ability to 
translate one world view into another. However, employing the skills of translation in 
this context is not easy. One needs to be extremely cautious and not assume that a 
word, concept or idea can be translated perfectly from one culture to another. The 
meaning of a word, concept or idea must be understood as it is used in its own 
cultural setting, before it is translated to another legal culture, whether the 
researcher’s own or a different foreign culture. To successfully carry out the task of 
translation, the comparatist should be able to explain the cultural context the relevant 
word, concept or idea is situated in. A successful translation presupposes and relies on 
the prior knowledge and mastery of diverse semiotic systems and linguistic contexts, 
as well as the ability to determine how to adjust and transfer over a particular world 
view into another. If this task is accomplished well, translation can act as a bridge 
between cultures, illuminating the differences and similarities that exist between legal 
orders.
Studying foreign law presupposes not only knowledge of foreign language, but 
See V. Grosswald Curran, “Dealing in Difference: Comparative Law’s Potential for 
Broadening Legal Perspectives”, (1998) 46 American Journal of Comparative Law 657, 661. 
And see S. Glanert, “Translation Matters”, in S. Glanert (ed.) Comparative Law: Engaging 
Translation (Abingdon, Oxon, Routledge, 2014), 1. 
also familiarity with the legal terminology of the legal system being studied. As 
Harold Gutteridge has pointed out, “the pitfalls of terminology are the greatest 
difficulty and danger which the student of comparative law encounters in his 
novitiate.” Any form of translation involves the risk of overlooking the conceptual 
differences between national languages – differences which the comparatist must 
understand if he or she is to make sense of the objects being compared. A further 
problem here is that, even within the context of the same national language, words 
and linguistic structures used in legal terminology often have a different meaning 
from that which they have in everyday usage. For example, the word ‘provocation’ in 
ordinary English usage does not mean exactly the same as it does in English criminal 
law. Nor does the word ‘provocation’ in English law necessarily mean the same as the 
literal translation of ‘provocation’ in another legal system. Even if basic legal 
concepts in different countries are similar, different legal terms may be employed, and 
this may even occur within the same legal family. Conversely, even though the terms 
used may be identical, their substantive content or actual application may be 
different. Consider, for example, the term ‘equity’, used in both civil law and 
common law countries (aequitas, equité, Billigkeit). In civil law jurisdictions judges 
employ this concept whenever they do not wish to adopt a narrow or formal 
interpretation of a legal principle, especially when they wish to adapt such a principle 
to changing socio-economic circumstances. In the English common law tradition, on 
the other hand, the term ‘equity’ denotes the distinct body of law that evolved 
separately from the body of law developed by the common law courts. Other 
examples of identical terms which mean different things in different systems include 
‘jurisprudence’, which in France refers to case law whilst in England is usually 
H. C. Gutteridge, “The Comparative Aspects of Legal Terminology”, (1938) 12 Tulane Law 
Review 401, at 403.
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understood to denote the general theory or philosophy of law; ‘good faith’, which is 
used as a general clause in German commercial law, but is simply a synonym for 
honesty and fair dealing in English sale of goods law; and ‘Auftrag’, roughly 
translated into English as commission or mandate, which in Swiss law refers to both 
remunerated and unremunerated commissions, whilst in German law it covers only 
commissions of the latter type.
According to Walter Kamba, a comparative inquiry may be divided into a 
descriptive, identification and explanatory stage.  At the descriptive stage, one offers 
a description of the legal institutions, rules and principles the study is concerned with, 
as well as the relevant social problems and solutions provided by the legal systems 
under consideration. A proper description must be objective, i.e. free from critical 
evaluation, accurate and comprehensive. It is crucial to begin with a description of the 
legal institutions under comparison that uncovers their construction and intended or 
unintended consequences. The researcher must take into account all sources of law 
that the legal systems under consideration regard as authoritative, such as statutory 
enactments and judicial decisions, as well as the way in which these sources are 
understood and treated by legislative bodies, courts and academic scholars. 
Furthermore, he or she must clearly identify the factual situations that the relevant 
legal institution is designed to address. It is important that the researcher places the 
institution under consideration in the context of the entire legal system and examines 
its possible connections with institutions or rules in other areas of the law (such as 
constitutional provisions, procedural rules or requirements of international legal 
instruments).  Finally, attention must be given to socio-economic, political, 
ideological, cultural and other ‘extra-legal’ factors. Consideration of such factors is 
Remunerated commissions are referred to in German law as Dienstvertrag or Werkvertrag. 
W. J. Kamba, “Comparative Law: A Theoretical Framework”, (1974) 23 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, 485.
very important if one is to understand variations in the way in which the institutions 
under comparison operate in practice. 
At the identification stage, the similarities and differences between the systems 
being compared are identified and set out. At this stage, the comparatist must draw 
attention to the properties of the legal institutions under consideration and explain 
how these institutions resemble or are different from one another. 
Finally, at the explanatory stage the detected similarities and differences 
between the legal systems under comparison are explained or accounted for. 
Consideration of historical, socio-economic, cultural and other extra-legal factors can 
play a particularly important role at this stage. A historical analysis can reveal 
whether the legal institutions at issue are home-grown or borrowed from another legal 
system. On this basis one may conclude that the relevant institutions are similar 
because they have a common ancestry (e.g. they both derive from Roman law); or 
because they have developed in parallel or converged. In the case of parallel 
development, the institutions acquire similar features independently, whilst in the 
case of convergence they do so through some form of contact or through the 
mediation of another legal institution. The differences between the institutions under 
consideration may be explained by reference to the influence of extra-legal factors or 
as being due to an innovative doctrinal approach adopted by a national law-maker or 
As J. C. Reitz points out, “a good comparative law study should normally devote substantial 
effort to exploring the degree to which there are or are not functional equivalents of the aspect 
under study in one legal system in the other system or systems under comparison. This inquiry 
forces the comparatist to consider how each legal system works together as a whole. By asking 
how one legal system may achieve more or less the same result as another legal system without 
using the same terminology or even the same rule or procedure, the comparatist is pushed to 
appreciate the interrelationships between various areas of law, including especially the 
relationships between substantive law and procedure.” “How to Do Comparative Law”, (1998) 
46 American Journal of Comparative Law 617. 621-22.
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court.
Although it is not necessary to always follow the above order, all three stages 
must at some point be considered if the inquiry is to be regarded as a comparative 
one. According to Kamba, the way in which a comparatist deals with the questions he 
or she encounters at each stage of the comparative process depends on three factors: 
(i) the comparatist’s jurisprudential outlook, i.e. his general attitude to law;  (ii) the 
socio-cultural context of the legal systems under comparison; and (iii) the legal 
context of the legal issues under examination in the case of a micro-comparative 
study. In establishing what the law is in each jurisdiction under study one should: (a) 
be concerned to describe the normal conceptual world of the lawyers; (b) take into 
consideration all the sources on which a lawyer in that legal system might base his or 
her opinion as to what the law is; and, (c) take into consideration the possible gap 
between the law on the books and law in action, as well as possible gaps in available 
knowledge about either the law on the books or the law in action. Important issues 
that need to be considered when carrying out a comparative study include: (1) the 
type of legal system (national, subnational, transnational) and the legal family or 
tradition to which it belongs (civil law, common law, religious, hybrid); (2) the field 
of law in which the issue being studied is located (e.g. constitutional law, criminal 
law, administrative law, property law, etc); (3) the type of sources needed (e.g., 
statutes, law codes, transnational or international treaties, case books or law reports, 
legal encyclopaedias, textbooks, monographs, journal articles etc) and the techniques 
used in data collection (e.g., literature searches, interviews, empirical surveys); (4) 
language and translation issues; and, (5) critical analysis of the information collected 
and presentation of the conclusions set out in a clearly comparative framework. 
For example, a comparatist interested in legal history or the sociology of law will usually 
adopt a historical or sociological approach to the legal systems, institutions or rules under 
examination.
Stating the relative weight accorded to historical, socio-economic, cultural, 
ideological and political factors and the possible influence of these factors on the 
development and function of the legal rules or institutions under consideration is 
particularly important. Provided that the information obtained on the legal systems 
under comparison is accurate, the approach adopted is ultimately to be assessed in the 
light of the purposes or goals of the comparatist. In this respect one may ask, for 
example: does the approach adopted facilitate a better understanding of one’s own 
law? Does it help in the formulation of a well-grounded theory? Does it assist in the 
development of a law reform or legal unification or harmonization program?
As previously noted, an important aspect of the comparative law methodology 
is concerned with the issue of comparability of legal phenomena: the question of 
whether the legal institutions, rules or practices under consideration are open to 
comparison. Comparatists recognize that a comparison is meaningful when the 
objects being compared share certain common features, which can serve as a common 
denominator (tertium comparationis). Determining the requisite common features in 
the relevant objects occurs at the preliminary stage of the comparative inquiry. At this 
stage one examines the structure, purposes and functions of the legal institutions or 
rules one intends to compare, without, however, embarking on a detailed analysis of 
the study’s results. This analysis occurs in the main phase of the comparative inquiry, 
when one considers and attempts to explain the similarities and differences between 
the objects being compared. Certain legal institutions or rules may appear comparable 
at the preliminary stage of the inquiry, but as the comparative process progresses 
important differences may emerge. For example, legal institutions, which were 
initially assumed to be comparable due to certain common structural characteristics, 
may subsequently prove to operate in entirely different ways. In other words, whether 
two or more legal institutions that prima facie appear to be comparable in fact share 
certain common characteristics (e.g. are intended to address the same problem) often 
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cannot be declared with certainty before the actual comparison is executed. 
Although resolving the problem of comparability does not presuppose the full 
application of the comparative method, ascertaining comparability is not always easy. 
The following two questions must be addressed: What are the criteria for ascertaining 
the existence of common elements or characteristics in the objects one seeks to 
compare? To what extent are considerations pertaining to the broader socio-
economic, political and cultural environment relevant to defining these criteria? The 
following paragraphs elaborate the different theoretical approaches to the problem of 
comparability, which is one of the major theoretical problems of comparative law 
methodology.
The Normative-Dogmatic Approach to the Comparability Issue
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries comparatists tended to proceed from 
the assumption that the common ground rendering the comparison of two or more 
legal institutions possible emanates from their institutional affinity. They believed, in 
other words, that similar legal institutions, norms, concepts and principles reflect 
general legal ideas or patterns that reside in most, if not all, legal orders. In the case 
of normative-dogmatic comparison one proceeds from a consideration of legal terms, 
concepts and categories peculiar to one’s own legal system. It is supposed that 
another comparable legal system uses the same terms, concepts and categories, and 
that behind a similar name there exists a common legal idea or pattern. 
The comparative law of the German Begriffsjurisprudenz (conceptual 
jurisprudence)  preferred this kind of comparison of conceptual forms as it hoped to 
use it to prove the existence of general, universally valid legal systematics. 
Comparative law could reveal the common core or essence (Wesen) of basic juridical 
concepts, even if it was recognized that every legal order has a system of its own. The 
unitary and universalistic mentality underpinning the definition of comparative law 
adopted at the First International Congress of Comparative Law in 1900 reflects a 
similar approach.  However, the criticism directed against this school of thought has 
been annihilating. One of the most vigorous attacks upon the methods of the 
Begriffsjurisprudenz emanated from Rudolf Jhering, who insisted that legal theory 
must abandon the delusion that it is a system of legal mathematics, without any 
higher aim than a correct reckoning with conceptual schemes.  Furthermore, since 
the period of logical empiricism, a tendency prevailed to regard questions concerning 
the nature and essence of legal concepts as generally meaningless. The so-called 
Analytical School of law typically reduces legal problems to relationships between 
legal facts (Rechtstatbestand) and legal consequences (Rechtsfolge). Scholars who 
have adopted the analytical method and its conceptual nominalism (through logical 
empiricism) claimed that many traditional concepts were ‘empty’ and therefore 
Bergriffsjurisprudenz placed strong emphasis on the formulation of abstract, logically 
interconnected, conceptual categories and principles as a means of developing a highly 
systematic body of positive law. See, e.g., Georg Friedrich Puchta, Cursus der Institutionem I 
(Leipzig 1841), esp. 95-108; Bernhard Windscheid, Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, 7th ed., 
(Frankfurt 1891) I, 59-60. 
As E. Lambert declared at that Congress: “Comparative law must resolve the accidental and 
divisive differences in the laws of peoples at similar stages of cultural and economic 
development, and reduce the number of divergences in law, attributable not to the political, 
moral or social qualities of the different nations but to historical accident or to temporary or 
contingent circumstances”. “Conception générale et definition de la science du droit comparé”, 
in Procès verbaux des séances et documents du Congrès international de droit comparé 1900, 
(1905-1907), I, 26. Lambert drew a distinction between comparative law based on historical and 
ethnological research, concerned with the discovery and understanding of universal laws of 
social evolution and serving mainly scientific and theoretical purposes; and comparative law as 
a special branch of legal science seeking to identify common elements of legislation in different 
states with a view to laying the basis for the development of a ‘common legislative law’ (droit 
commun legislatif).
See R. Jhering, Scherz und Ernst in der Jurisprudenz (Leipzig1884).
 Addressing Methodological Challenges in Comparative Law Research MOUSOURAKIS George
concepts with an extensional reference should be used. In other words, one must 
consider the function, not the imaginary essence of the concepts. From this point of 
view, one might assert that the regulation of contracts, for example, can be reduced to 
single relationships between legal facts and legal consequences. The event where 
certain consequences did not ensue can be termed ‘invalidity’, but otherwise the 
concept has no content at all.
Even if it is accepted on an abstract level that one can detect certain common 
patterns, the substantive content of a particular legal institution and the way it 
operates in practice, often differs considerably from one legal system to another. The 
further apart two legal systems are the more difficult it is to rely on the assumption of 
institutional affinity as a basis of the comparison, for the differences in the content 
and function of the legal institutions in these systems would tend to negate that 
assumption. The unsatisfactory nature of a purely normative-dogmatic approach to 
the issue of comparability was noted when scholars embarked on the comparative 
study of civil law and common law legal systems. Certain legal institutions and 
categories of civil law systems were unknown to common law systems. On the other 
hand, basic categories of common law systems, such as the distinction between 
common law and equity are not found in the legal systems of Continental Europe. 
These differences that affected basic legal concepts and categories, legal terminology, 
structures of law, interpretation of legal norms and distinctive features of law 
enforcement were explained by reference to the specific historical circumstances 
under which the relevant legal systems developed. A further problem of the 
normative-dogmatic approach is that prima facie identical legal terms do not always 
have the same meaning in different legal systems.  On the other hand, certain legal 
See, e.g., A. Aarnio, Denkweisen der Rechtswissenschaft (Vienna and New York, Springer, 
1979), 65 ff.
institutions may be comparable even when the differences between them with respect 
to legal terminology are so great that, in terms of language, it is difficult to recognize 
any common elements. 
The reaction to the formalism and extreme conceptualism of the German 
Bergriffsjurisprudenz led to the emergence of new trends in European legal thought. 
Examples of such trends include Zweckjurisprudenz  (focusing on the purposes that 
legal rules and institutions serve) and Interessenjurisprudenz  (focusing on societal 
interests as the chief subject-matter of law), which were precursors of legal realism  
and the sociology of law.  These new approaches are also connected with the rise of 
functionalism in comparative law.
The Functional Method of Comparative Law
The shortcomings of the normative-dogmatic approach prompted contemporary 
comparatists to adopt the view that to ascertain the real similarities and differences 
between the substantive contents of legal systems, one must start not with the names 
For instance, ‘equity’, is a term that is used in both common law and civil law systems. In 
English law the technical meaning of this term refers to a body of law that developed separately 
from the judge-made common law. The boundary between equity and law was so clearly drawn 
that English lawyers tend to think of the relevant distinction as juristically inevitable. By 
contrast, in civil law countries such as France and Germany, equity is a clearly recognized 
element in the administration of justice. Judges in these countries use the concept whenever they 
do not wish to adopt a formal or narrow interpretation of a legal principle, or when they wish to 
adapt such a principle to changing social conditions. 
See R. Jhering, Der Zweck im Recht (Leipzig 1877).
Consider on this P. Heck, “Gesetzesauslegung und Interessenjurisprudenz”, (1914) 112 Archiv 
für die civilistische Praxis, 1.
See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law (London 1881); “The Path of the Law”, 
(1897) 10 Harvard Law Review, 457.
R. Pound, “The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence”, (1911) 24 Harvard Law 
Review, 591; (1912) 25 Harvard Law Review, 489.
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of legal rules and institutions, but instead one should consider their functions, i.e. 
those real or potential conflict situations which the rules under examination are 
intended to regulate. The compared legal institutions must be comparable to each 
other functionally: they must be designed to deal with the same social problem. This 
common function furnishes the required tertium comparationis that renders 
comparison possible.
Functional comparison does not proceed from a legal term or norm to a social 
fact but from a social fact to the legal regulation thereof. One does not compare 
abstract or general legal notions but, rather, how the legal systems under 
consideration deal with the same factual situations in real life. In other words, a 
prerequisite of functional legal comparison is the comparability of basic social 
conditions and problems. Such a similarity creates the possibility of concluding that 
the respective legal solutions found in different legal systems are comparable. 
According to Rheinstein, the principle of functionality requires comparative inquiries 
to “go beyond the taxonomic description or technical application of one or more 
systems of positive law…. every rule and institution has to justify its existence under 
two inquiries: First, what function does it serve in present society? Second, does it 
serve this function well or would another rule serve it better?”  And as Kamba 
points out, a key question for the comparatist is: “what legal norms, concepts or 
As O. Brand points out, “Functionalism is so centrally relevant to contemporary comparative 
law because of its orientation towards the practical. it is particularly concerned with how to 
compare the law's consequences across legal systems and therefore allows rules and concepts to 
be appreciated for what they do, rather than for what they say. Functionalists believe that the 
"function" of a rule, its social purpose, is the common denominator (tertium comparationis) that 
permits comparison.” “Conceptual Comparisons: Towards a Coherent Methodology of 
Comparative Legal Studies”, (2007) 32 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 405, 409.
M. Rheinstein, “Teaching Comparative Law”, (1938) 5 University of Chicago Law Review, 
615 at 617-618.
institutions in one system perform the equivalent functions performed by certain legal 
norms, concepts or institutions of another system?”
The resolution of a particular social problem may be achieved through a 
combination of different legal means in different systems. For instance, the institution 
of trust or trust ownership in English law has no equivalent in Romano-Germanic 
legal systems where the functions it fulfils are realized with the assistance of direct 
representation of a person lacking dispositive legal capacity by their legal 
representative. As this shows, different legal means are used to attain the same legal 
and social goal, i.e. defending the interests of a person lacking dispositive legal 
capacity. The fact that one of the two analysed systems does not possess a direct 
equivalent of a legal institution found in the other does not mean that there is a gap in 
the law nor that the two systems are incomparable with respect to the solutions they 
W. J. Kamba, “Comparative Law: A Theoretical Framework”, (1974) 23 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, 485 at 517. As Zweigert and Kötz explain, “The basic 
methodological principle of all comparative law is that of functionality. From this basic 
principle stem all the other rules which determine the choice of laws to compare, the scope of 
the undertaking, the creation of a system of comparative law, and so on. Incomparables cannot 
usefully be compared, and in law the only things which are comparable are those which fulfil 
the same function.” An Introduction to Comparative Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 
1987), 31. The authors point out that “function is the start-point and basis of all comparative 
law. It is the tertium comparationis, so long the subject of futile discussion among earlier 
comparatists. For the comparative process this means that the solutions we find in the different 
jurisdictions must be cut loose from their conceptual context and stripped of their national 
doctrinal overtones so that they may be seen purely in the light of their function, as an attempt to 
satisfy a particular legal need. It means also that we must look to function in order to determine 
the proper ambit of the solution under comparison.” (Idem at p. 42). And see M. Siems, 
Comparative Law, 2nd ed., (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2018), 31 ff; G. Samuel, 
An Introduction to Comparative Law Theory and Method (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2014), 65 ff; 
R. Michaels, “The Functional Method of Comparative Law”, in M. Reimann & R. Zimmermann 
(eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law, 2nd ed., (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2019), 345.
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have adopted for a particular social and legal problem. Thus, functional comparison 
may be defined as the study of legal means and methods for the resolution of similar 
or identical socio-legal problems adopted by different legal systems. Such a 
comparison serves both theoretical-scientific and applied-practical purposes, thus 
promoting a better understanding and assessment of legal institutions within one’s 
own law.
Functionalism rests on three interconnected premises. The first premise relates 
to the realist understanding of law as an instrument for guiding human behaviour and 
as a means of resolving conflicts and furthering social interests. This premise 
embodies the ‘problem-solution’ approach that functionalists advocate. Comparatists 
following this approach begin their comparisons by selecting a particular practical 
problem or social conflict. They then consider how different systems of law seek to 
resolve this problem. Finally, in a third stage, the similarities and differences between 
the solutions offered by the systems under consideration are identified, explained and 
assessed. The second premise of functionalism is that most of the problems that the 
law seeks to resolve are similar if not identical across diverse legal systems. The third 
basic premise of functionalism relates to the assumption that legal systems tend to 
resolve practical problems in the same way. The German comparatist Konrad 
Zweigert, cites many examples from various legal systems, to argue that in 
‘unpolitical’ areas of private law, such as commercial and property transactions and 
business dealings, the similarities in the substantive contents of legal rules and the 
practical solutions to which they lead are so significant that one may speak of a 
In this connection, it should be noted that, according to some scholars, the functional 
approach may be construed to eliminate the problem of comparability as the social needs that 
legal institutions and rules address are largely the same in most systems. See M. Ancel, “Le 
probléme de la comparabilité et la méthode fonctionelle en droit comparé”, Festschrift für Imre 
Zajtay (Tubingen 1982), 5.
‘presumption of similarity’ (praesumptio similitudinis).  This presumption, he 
claims, can serve as a useful tool in the comparative study of different legal systems. 
At the end of a comparative study, if the comparatist concludes that the solutions 
offered by the examined systems are identical or compatible, this may be regarded as 
confirmation that he or she probably understood and compared them correctly. The 
discovery of substantial differences is a warning that an error may exist and thus the 
process should be repeated and the results carefully verified.  This ‘presumption of 
similarity’ is connected with the idea that it might be possible to develop, on the basis 
of comparative research, a system of general legal principles that could acquire 
international recognition. According to Zweigert:
[The international unification of law] cannot be achieved by simply 
conjuring up an ideal law on any topic and hoping to have it adopted. One 
must first find what is common to the jurisdictions concerned and 
incorporate that in the uniform law. Where there are areas of difference, 
one must reconcile them either by adopting the best existing variant or by 
finding, through comparative methods, a new solution which is better and 
See, e.g., K. Zweigert, “Des solutions identiques par des voies différentes”, (1966) 18 Revue 
internationale de droit comparé, 5; K. Zweigert and H. Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative 
Law, 2nd ed., (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1987), 36. And see See G. Dannemann, “Comparative 
Law: Study of Similarities or Differences?”, in M. Reimann & R. Zimmerman (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of Comparative Law, 2nd ed., (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2019), 390, 394-
395.
According to Zweigert and Kötz, “The comparatist can rest content if his researches ... lead to 
the conclusion that the systems he has compared reach the same or similar practical results, but 
if he finds that there are great differences or indeed diametrically opposite results, he should be 
warned and go back to check again whether the terms in which he posed his original question 
were indeed purely functional, and whether he has spread the net of his researches quite wide 
enough.” An Introduction to Comparative Law, 3nd ed., (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1998), 40.
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more easily applied than any of the existing ones. Preparatory studies in 
comparative law are absolutely essential here; without them one cannot 
discover the points of agreement or disagreement in the different legal 
systems of the world, let alone decide which of the actual or proposed 
solutions is the best.
It is important to note here that Zweigert, in both publications where he elaborates the 
idea of a ‘presumption of similarity’ refers only to the field of private law and within 
this field to the law of contract and the law of tort, but not to family law. Moreover, he 
recognizes that there are important differences between legal systems in the way they 
attain their solutions. It is the solutions to societal problems that are often the same. 
Based on the above three premises, functionalists seek to explain the 
similarities and differences between legal norms found in diverse jurisdictions and 
how such norms are expressed in different or similar kinds of legal rules. They stress 
the importance of neutrality in the study of legal systems and legal institutions and 
the need to avoid approaching foreign laws through the mindset of one’s own legal 
system. In other words, functionalists pay little attention to differences relating to the 
technical-juridical construction of rules, emphasizing that “the solutions [found] in 
the different jurisdictions must be cut loose from their conceptual context and 
stripped of their national doctrinal overtones so that they may be seen purely in the 
light of their function, as an attempt to satisfy a particular legal need.”  In this 
respect, the functional approach constitutes a major departure from the methods of 
K. Zweigert and H. Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law, 2nd ed., (Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1987), 23. 
K. Zweigert and H. Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law, 3nd ed., (Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1998), 44. And see J. C. Reitz, “How to Do Comparative Law”, (1998) 46 American 
Journal of Comparative Law 617, 621-22.
nineteenth and early twentieth century scholars, who tended to place the emphasis on 
the wording, structure and systematic classification of legal rules and institutions 
rather than on the social purposes they were intended to serve. It has been adopted by 
comparatists in Europe, the United States and elsewhere, and continues to play a key 
part in comparative law research today.  There is a universalist trend inherent to 
functionalism, as this approach is taken to rest on the assumption that “the legal 
system of every society faces essentially the same problems, and solves these 
problems by quite different means though very often with similar results.”
However, for all its merits functionalism is not without problems. These 
pertain to the basic assumptions on which the functional method is based, i.e. the 
presence of a legal need that is common to the legal systems under consideration; and 
the existence of a similarity in the factual circumstances of the compared laws. 
According to the functional approach, a meaningful comparison is not possible unless 
the relevant problem is defined in similar practical terms by the compared legal 
systems. In other words, one cannot deal with a problem that has a different social 
significance in one of the systems under examination; in such a case there is no issue 
of legal rules or principles of similar function. However, because of the multiplicity 
of legal functions that may exist on different levels and may differ between cultures, 
‘common need’ or ‘function’ and ‘similarity’ with respect to factual circumstances 
may be difficult to ascertain, even within one’s familiar socio-economic 
The more recent trend to combine comparative law and economics may be taken to constitute 
a narrower version of functionalism focusing not on social functions in general but on a 
particular function, namely the efficiency of a legal rule or institution in economic terms. See U. 
Mattei, Comparative Law and Economics (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1997); 
“Efficiency in Legal Transplants: An Essay in Comparative Law and Economics”, (1994) 14 
International Review of Law and Economics, 3.
K. Zweigert and H. Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law, 2nd ed., (Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1987), 31.
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environment.  The diverse functions of the law on different levels – social, political, 
economic, religious, spiritual, symbolic – may be difficult to detect, describe and 
evaluate in terms of importance and thus functionality ultimately depends on the 
viewpoint embraced.  As McDougal remarks, “the demand for inquiring into 
function is…but the beginning of insight. Further questions are: ‘functional’ for 
whom, against whom, with respect to what values, determined by what decision-
makers, under what conditions, how, with what effects”.  As this suggests, it would 
be requisite for the functional method to have a broad scope so as to take proper 
account of the relativity in the socio-economic and cultural circumstances under 
which legal institutions operate. What is needed, in other words, is a method that 
focuses on the function of law as this function is conditioned by the socio-economic 
and cultural environment. Legal rules and institutions should be examined in light of 
their broader implications, with respect to not only the legal but also the social, 
economic and political system. As Ainsworth remarks, “[because a] legal order 
simultaneously encompasses systems of political arrangements, social relations, 
According to commentators, “the functional approach runs the risk of simplifying complex 
reality by assuming that similarity of problems produces similarity of results”. G. Frankenberg, 
“Critical Comparisons: Re-thinking Comparative Law”, (1985) 26 Harvard International Law 
Journal, 411 at 436. 
Focusing on the issue of economic efficiency as the sole basis for comparing laws, as the 
strict law and economics approach suggests, represents a reductionist understanding of law and 
its role in society.
M. S. McDougal, “The Comparative Study of Law for Policy Purposes: Value Clarification as 
an Instrument of Democratic World Order”, in W. E. Butler (ed.) International Law in 
Comparative Perspective (Maryland, Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1980), 191 at 219. Consider also D. 
J. Gerber, “Sculpturing the Agenda of Comparative Law: Ernst Rabel and the Facade of 
Language”, in Annelise Riles (ed.), Rethinking the Masters of Comparative Law (Oxford, Hart 
Publishing, 2001), 204; B. Markesinis, Comparative Law in the Courtroom and in the 
Classroom: The Story of the Last Thirty-Five Years (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2003), 39.
interpersonal interactional practices, economic processes, cultural categorizations, 
normative beliefs, psychological habits, philosophical perspectives and ideological 
values”, we must scrutinize not only rules but also legal cultures, traditions, ideals, 
ideologies, identities and entire legal discourses.  In other words, an interdisciplinary 
and comprehensive approach is a prerequisite for avoiding false assumptions on 
seemingly ‘identical’ societal problems and ill-founded, de-contextualized evaluations 
of legal solutions.
J. E. Ainsworth, “Categories and Culture: On the ‘Rectification of Names’ in Comparative 
Law”, (1996) 82 Cornell Law Review, 19 at 28.
It should be noted here that traditional functionalists have also called for an interdisciplinary 
approach, albeit in somewhat different terms. According to Pierre Lepaulle, “[I]t must be clear 
that a comparison restricted to one legal phenomenon in two countries is unscientific and 
misleading. A legal system is a unity, the whole of which expresses itself in each part; the same 
blood runs in the whole organism. An identical provision of the law of two countries may have 
wholly different moral backgrounds, may have been brought about by the interplay of wholly 
different forces and hence the similarity may be due to the purest coincidence – no more 
significant than the double meaning of a pun”. “The Function of Comparative Law”, (1921-
1922) 35 Harvard Law Review, 838 at 853. Similarly, Rabel, one of the founders of 
functionalism, points out that “The material of reflection about legal problems must be the law 
of the entire globe, past and present, the relation of the law to the land, the climate, and race, 
with historical fates of peoples, - war, revolution, state-building, subjugation -, with religious 
and moral conceptions; ambitions and creative power of individuals; need of goods production 
and consumption; interests of ranks, parties, classes. Intellectual currents of all kinds are at 
work… Everything is conditioned on everything else in social, economic and legal design”. E. 
Rabel, Aufgabe und Notwendigkeit der Rechtsvergleichung (Munich 1925), 5. See also E. 
Rothacker, “Die vergleichende Methode in den Geisteswissenschaften”, (1957) 60 Zeitschrift für 
vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft, 13 at 31; M. Siems, Comparative Law, 2nd ed., (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2018), 44. For a critical assessment of functionalism see also O. 
Brand, “Conceptual Comparisons: Towards a Coherent Methodology of Comparative Legal 
Studies”, (2007) 32 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 405; M. Graziadei, “The 
Functionalist Heritage”, in P. Legrand & R. Munday (eds), Comparative Legal Studies: 
Traditions and Transitions (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003), 100.
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This means that the use of the functional method demands from the 
comparatist an extremely broad knowledge not only of contemporary law, but also 
sociology, anthropology and history, among other things, i.e. a level of knowledge 
that is very difficult, if not impossible, for a comparatist to attain.  Because of this 
problem, functional legal comparison is usually conducted by international teams of 
experts. Specific socio-legal problems are assigned to national rapporteurs in 
accordance with a preliminary scheme designed with the aim of taking comparison 
into account. The representative of each national system then submits a report 
explaining how the law of each system resolves the specific problem being 
considered. This collective approach to functional comparison has considerable 
advantages, although it often involves significant costs and requires great 
organizational efforts and time.
Combining the Functional and Normative-Dogmatic Perspectives
The starting-point of comparative law is usually the appearance of common social 
problems in different legal orders. The question is whether there are common features 
or, conversely, differences in their legal regulation within these diverse legal orders. 
How should these similarities or differences be explained? The existence of a 
common social problem is not a sufficient starting-point for comparative law. For a 
meaningful legal comparison to be undertaken, there must also be some form that is 
sufficiently similar. As Watson notes, some common features of legal culture are 
As J. C. Reitz remarks, “good comparatists should be sensitive to the ever-present limitations 
on information available about foreign legal systems and should qualify their conclusions if they 
are unable to have access to sufficient information or if they have reason to suspect that they are 
missing important information. If the gaps are too large, the study should not be undertaken at 
all because its conclusions about foreign law will be too uncertain to be useful.” “How to Do 
Comparative Law”, (1998) 46 American Journal of Comparative Law 617, 631.
essential; a relationship is required to render comparative law possible.  This 
relationship can be actual and historical or also ‘inner’ – an undeniable similarity 
between the peoples whose legal systems are compared. Historically, problems, 
juridical forms and their systematic organization are older than the norms of present 
law. General doctrines are extremely relevant as a framework for comparative legal 
studies. This is partly due to the presence of common problems but partly also due to 
historical tradition, e.g. the fact that Roman law has been an important common basis 
of many contemporary legal systems. Thus, the conceptual system of Roman law is 
an apt tertium comparationis, a common denominator of the legally organized 
relationships of life. These relationships are organized by forms that are derived from 
Roman law and are based on concepts such as culpa, contractus, bona fides and such 
like. These forms constitute a kind of pre-knowledge for most Western legal thinking. 
A system of forms is meaningful when it corresponds to a related system of 
content. A legal system cannot but be both formal and substantial. But it is by no 
means obvious that the legal concepts and the juristic systematics of forms are a 
sufficient means to organize social states of affairs as far as comparative law is 
concerned. A functional coherence between social states of affairs must be 
established. Can this be expressed by an abstract scheme? In legal science, attempts 
have been made to reduce social relations to single right-duty relations, which are the 
objects of legal regulation. There are formal systems of legal relations. Consider, for 
example, the system proposed by Wesley Hohfeld, whereby all legal relations 
between humans can be expressed with the help of ‘fundamental legal conceptions.’  
The basic relations are: right – duty; privilege – no right; power – liability; immunity 
A. Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law (Edinburgh, Scottish 
Academic Press, 1974; 2nd ed., Athens, Georgia, University of Georgia Press, 1993).
See W. N. Hohfeld “Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning”, 
(1917) 26 Yale Law Journal, 710.
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– disability. With the help of such schemes, similarities and differences in legal 
regularities can be articulated in a particularly graphic manner. Such an approach 
could be used in comparative law to deal, for example, with the question concerning 
the legal positions of the buyer and the seller in the case of faulty goods. Has the 
buyer the right to have the goods repaired or is their legal position only a privilege? 
Has he or she the power to change their legal position by annulling the contract? 
Although such legal relations may be abstract relations, they are also 
connected with social reality. A buyer is not only a buyer; he or she has other social 
roles to play, and these roles might determine that he or she must play the role of the 
buyer in a certain situation. The contractual roles express the relations of exchange of 
certain goods. But actual contractual relations are, to a considerable extent, not 
determined by the uniform will of the parties concerned but by their social roles. In 
short, legal roles and relations express other, often more basic, social positions. But 
this does not mean that analyses of legal relations have no value. Even if schemes 
such as the fundamental legal conceptions of Hohfeld are purely formal, they provide 
useful starting-points. Abstract legal relations are first described. Then one proceeds 
to ask whether they can be explained in terms of more basic social relations. Legal 
relations and the models of behaviour they express are based upon an experimental 
shaping of social relations. But this shaping is not purely empirical and cognitive. 
There are reactions, also partly evaluative, when certain states of affairs are chosen on 
axiological grounds as consciously followed goals. But this process involves a set of 
juristic forms, which are not incidental or particular to the relevant case: they stem 
from the history of legal doctrines and ideas. Thus, we may assert that whether we 
proceed from forms or from contents, the choices of subjects are not purely empirical; 
axiological and teleological choices must be considered and examined together with 
the doctrinal history of legal concepts and their systematic treatment.
To understand social function, one must comprehend social structures. It is 
important that legal comparatists keep this in mind. For example, if one says, “in 
country A Lawmaker Z introduced the law L1 and in the country B Lawmaker X 
enacted the law L2’, it is obvious that even if the lawmakers were the human causes 
of the relevant legal enactments we cannot build a reasonable comparison of L1 and 
L2 solely upon the personalities of Lawmakers Z and X. An understanding of the 
social situation is needed. We must grasp the conditions in the respective countries, 
i.e. their social structures that set the limits upon the legislative activities of 
lawmakers. 
The structuralist view of society is related to the Marxist theory of the state 
and law: it refers to the socio-economic basis of law; law and state are phenomena of 
the so-called suprastructure. The basis consists of ‘real’ relations of production and 
exchange. Law is conditioned by the state, which in turn, is conditioned by class 
relations and cultural factors. But one cannot speak of the Marxist theory of law. 
Even though dialectical materialism is a common element among Marxists, their 
opinions differ considerably when the precise interrelationship of law and economics 
is contemplated. Law is not determined by the economic basis. Law is relatively 
independent: it not only expresses social relations but also influences them. Law also 
expresses certain historical traditions pertaining to the different ways of looking at 
legal issues. Law may be considered as a form of social power. But the role of law is 
not uniform in different societies: law can have a wider or narrower scope; it can 
cover a relatively larger or smaller part of intentional human behaviour. Legal 
regulation in society has both an explicit and a latent non-intentional function – this is 
the thesis of the German functionalist sociologists of law, such as Niklas Luhmann.  
Law is not only a form but also a social structure whose functions may vary. Legal 
forms and their social context are interconnected. We can declare that comparative 
law proceeds from the following two assumptions: (a) law is not only a manifestation 
of will but is also socially constructed – one cannot compare legal regulations on a 
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purely formal basis; (b) law stems from social relations, but it cannot be entirely 
reduced to them, for otherwise one should not compare law at all but only the basic 
factors law expresses. There is an intentional element in law; its ‘facts’ are not ‘brute 
facts’ but institutional facts, which should be interpreted in their social context.  
Intentional human action can be interpreted with the assistance of an 
intentional scheme involving: (a) goals, i.e. states of affairs which have certain 
properties justifying their perception as valuable; and (b) epistemic conditions, i.e. 
knowledge concerning, among other things, social structures, possible means and 
means-goals relations. A decision to act (or not to act) may be construed as deriving 
from the combination of the above factors. It is important to realize that a value-
element is present in all intentional decision-making, including lawmaking and the 
application of law. A value-element is also present in concepts used for imparting 
regulatory information. Evaluative concepts such as, for example, good faith and 
equity, are important, because the rapid development of society often renders it 
impossible for the legislator to foresee all potential situations. It is insufficient to 
compare the form and the factual content of a legal institution to some similar 
institution in another legal order. There is an evaluative component between facts and 
concepts, and this should not be ignored. 
N. Luhmann's social theory is a systemic ‘supertheory’ of the social. This theory is universal 
in that it is a theory of everything, of the world, as seen and reconstructed from the standpoint of 
sociology, including a theory of itself. It is systemic because it uses the guiding difference 
(Leitdifferenz) between the system and the environment as its main conceptual tool to analyze 
the production and reproduction of the social. Analyzing society as a hypercomplex 
conglomerate of social subsystems, Luhmann insists that modern societies are so complex that 
his own theory of social complexity can offer only one possible formulation of the social among 
others. See N. Luhmann, Rechtssystem und Rechtsdogmatik (Stuttgart, W. Kohlhammer, 1974); 
The Differentiation of Society (New York, Columbia University Press, 1982); Social Systems 
(Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1995); Law as a Social System (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2004). 
It is submitted that most legal concepts are evaluative concepts, even if their 
value-laden nature is often only latent, concealed or not even contemplated. One may 
refer to a normative use of legal language. Such a use occurs every time when 
regulatory information is presented or applied in legal decision-making. One might 
perhaps assert that there is an element of decision-making in every step of an 
interpretatory operation. There are two basic components in such an operation: 
observation and evaluation. This suggests that relevant concepts also have two 
inherent aspects, a descriptive and a prescriptive one. Such an approach has far-
According to Searle, there are some entities in the world that seem to exist wholly 
independently of human institutions, and he designates these ‘brute facts.’ Their existence 
appears in no way dependent on our will, nor do they result from our practices and contrivances. 
Other entities, by contrast, do not seem to exist in this way. For example, consider a goal in a 
football match. If someone asks me what that is, I cannot point to anything in the material world 
that I can specify as a goal. I cannot point to a ball crossing the line and say, ‘that is what I mean 
by a goal’. And yet, I can intelligibly articulate the existence of a thing such as a goal. 
According to Searle, these facts may be called institutional facts: “[They] are indeed facts; but 
their existence, unlike the existence of brute facts, presupposes the existence of certain human 
institutions. It is only given the institution of marriage that certain forms of behaviour constitute 
Mr Smith's marrying Miss Jones. Similarly, it is only given the institution of baseball that 
certain movements by certain men constitute the Dodgers beating the Giants 3 to 2 innings. 
Even at a simpler level, it is only given the institution of money that I now have a 5-dollar bill in 
my hand. Take away the institution and all I have is a piece of paper with various green and grey 
markings.” J. R. Searle, Speech Acts (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1969), 51. See 
also E. Anscombe, “On Brute Facts”, Analysis 18 (1957-58), 69. Legal entities appear to exist 
and behave in a similar way to our goal in a football match. For example, every time I board a 
bus a contract is formed between myself and the bus company, but I cannot point to it in the 
material world. I cannot point to myself getting on the bus and buying the ticket and say: ‘that is 
the contract’. And yet I can, and legal practitioners do all the time, intelligibly allude to a 
contract. To declare that a contract exists presupposes the adoption of a particular view of a 
particular relation between two people, namely, that which is set within the frame of reference of 
certain organised groups of people, such as the legal profession, judges and law enforcement 
agents.
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reaching implications for the methodology of comparative law. Consider, for 
example, a comparative analysis of attempts at reforming the law governing family 
relations. Such an analysis presupposes that the relationship between the institution of 
family and social ideologies is clarified. Between the present historical situation of 
society and current law there is an intermediate factor that enables us to understand 
this relationship. This may be termed ‘the world-picture’. A world-picture 
corresponds, at a certain moment, to the basic structure of society. Legislation 
corresponds to the world-picture. The legislation is, one might say, a manifestation of 
the world-picture reflecting the way certain groups in society conceive the prevailing 
state of affairs and the manner in which matters should be arranged. 
A world-picture is a set of beliefs held by certain social groups. It is an 
interpretation of nature, humankind and society. It is set forth by legal norms as the 
dominant ideology, whose function is also to explain and legitimate them. A world-
picture contains opinions or beliefs on the status of matters at a certain moment and 
how these should exist now and in the future. The use of a particular world-picture 
for the purpose of legitimating legal norms presupposes a social group or class 
believing in such a world-picture and having sufficient social power to further its 
inherent goals. An analysis of social and state power is therefore needed when one 
seeks to understand and explain legal institutions. One should ask: which social group 
possesses the power to impose its own world-picture – its knowledge, beliefs and 
desires regarding society – as the basis for the creation and application of legal 
norms. After addressing this question, one can proceed to an analysis of those factors 
that led to the normative modelling of society through law in a certain way. 
There are two types of elements in a world-picture: factual-theoretical and 
normative-ideological. These elements are intertwined in a very complicated manner, 
but they can be treated separately at an abstract level. The factual-theoretical element 
can be divided into two parts: actual and possible states of affairs. For instance, the 
factual-theoretical element of the notion of family consists of a set of propositions on 
the definition of the family, its social position and functions. These beliefs are to a 
considerable extent based on everyday experience, which complements systematic 
theoretical knowledge and also supplies its interpretative basis. The normative-
ideological aspect of the notion of family comprises a set of opinions concerning the 
question of how matters in society should exist. Every notion of the family contains 
viewpoints relating to social goals. Some states of affairs have not yet been realized, 
but they are deemed desirable, just, fair or equitable. The normative-ideological 
element furnishes a criterion that enables one to claim that the present state of affairs 
falls short of the desired one and, at the same time, articulates the means considered 
necessary for rectifying the situation. It is submitted that one should endeavour to 
devise a model of comparative analysis that would embrace both factual-theoretical 
and normative-ideological elements. Such a model would be an improvement over 
the traditional method of comparative law, in which the evaluative dimension of law-
making is often neglected and, consequently, the (undeniable) role of traditional, 
historical systematics in the conceptual organization of regulatory information tends 
to be over-emphasized. 
We may say, in conclusion, that in the quest for comparability, a mid-way 
approach – one that views the normative-dogmatic and functional methods not as 
contradictory but rather as complementary – appears more appropriate. Legal 
solutions relating to a particular social problem presuppose an analysis of specific 
legal norms and institutions. At the same time, considerable attention needs to be paid 
to the purposes that legal norms and institutions serve, i.e. their social role. The 
normative-dogmatic and functional comparison methods may thus be combined, 
although, depending on the goals of the particular study, either of these may be 
accorded priority. The common elements constituting the requisite tertium 
comparationis may appear at different levels pertaining to the language, structure, 
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functions, aims and outcomes of legal rules and institutions. Indeed, they may be 
present on several levels simultaneously. Depending on the nature, scope and goals of 
the comparative inquiry, several criteria of comparability may be used, either together 
or alternatively.  Knowledge of the goals the compared legal rules are intended to 
achieve is particularly important for understanding the detected differences and 
similarities. Such knowledge is also needed when one attempts to evaluate the legal 
solutions provided by the legal systems under consideration.
Concluding Remarks 
Comparative law has to compare many more elements than merely law, but its object 
is ultimately law. The methodological problems of comparative law cannot be 
addressed solely at the level of language – these problems are not exclusively 
semiotic.  A successful translation of legal terms, important though it may be, is 
hardly sufficient.  Nor does the existence of certain similar social relationships 
constitute a sufficient condition for comparison. Although for a meaningful legal 
comparison to be carried out there must exist sufficient similarity with respect to 
Suppose, for example, that one wishes to compare the text of a German statutory provision on 
marriage with that of a French statute on the registration of real property. If considered from the 
viewpoint of their substantive contents, these statutes have nothing in common and therefore are 
not open to comparison. If, on the other hand, one is interested in comparing how the text of the 
relevant statutes is structured, i.e., how it is divided into sections and subsections, a comparison 
appears possible.
On the problem of legal translation see, e.g., M. H. Hoeflich, “Translation and the Reception 
of Foreign Law in the Antebellum United States”, (2002) 50 The American Journal of 
Comparative Law, 753; L. Rayar, “Translating Legal Texts: A Methodology”, Conference Paper, 
Euroforum, (April 1993).
Thus, as it has been pointed out by scholars, the most evident translations of Roman legal 
terms accepted in different legal cultures may be misleading. See O. Kahn-Freund, 
“Comparative Law as an Academic Subject”, (1966) 82 Law Quarterly Review, 40 at 52. 
social function, a form of conceptual commensurability is also required.  The role of 
legal concepts is multifaceted. They are used as vehicles of regulatory information 
guiding human action and thus have an important normative function. Furthermore, 
they steer the use of legal argument when legal norms are being created and applied. 
When the selection of a certain concept is considered, this entails the evaluation of 
certain sets of arguments. Hence legal concepts stand for arguments – a function that 
is connected with a historical tradition in a particular legal culture. It is also correct to 
assert that concepts and their systematic arrangement express systems of values.  
Elucidating these matters is one of the chief goals of comparative law. Attaining this 
goal presupposes that the methods applied have an adequate theoretical grounding; 
otherwise, comparative law will remain at the level of mere description or be 
ensnared in the trammels of speculation.
Consider on this D. Pearce, Roads to Commensurability (Dordrecht, D. Reidel, 1987), 188, 
194.
See W. Ewald, “The Jurisprudential Approach to Comparative Law: A Field Guide to ‘Rats’”, 
(1998) 46 American Journal of Comparative Law 701, 704-05; W. Ewald, “Comparative 
Jurisprudence (I): What Was It Like to Try a Rat?”, (1994-1995) 143 University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review 1889, 1973-74 (noting that it is important to compare law from an internal point of 
view so that we can understand how lawyers think in their own legal system). Consider also N. 
V. Demleitner, “Challenge, Opportunity and Risk: An Era of Change in Comparative Law”, 
(1998) 46 American Journal of Comparative Law 647, 652. 
